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HOW TERROR CHANGED JUSTICE: A
CALL TO REFORM SAFEGUARDS THAT
PROTECT AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
Jackie Lu*
“Every victory in the courtroom brings us closer to our ultimate
goal of victory in the war on terrorism. The Department of Justice
will continue its aggressive battle in the courts to ensure the safety
and security of all Americans.”1
INTRODUCTION
As Justice Sutherland stated in Berger v. United States, the
prosecutor “is a representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done.”2 As a representative of the government with the
objective of doing “justice,” a prosecutor has the ability to wield
the full resources of government to seek search warrants and
wiretaps, to pursue indictments, and to grant immunity from

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.A. Brown University, 1999. The
author wishes to thank her family and friends for their steadfast support and
guidance. Many thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law & Policy for their
dedication and insight.
1
Press Release, U.S. Att’y Gen., Statement of Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft on
Detroit Terror Case (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft on Detroit Terror
Case], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 2003/June/03_ag_331.htm.
2
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (reversing a conspiracy conviction because proof
against the defendant was weak and prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
misrepresenting facts and making improper insinuations during trial, thus
prejudicing the defense).
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prosecution.3 United States Attorneys, working under the
Department of Justice, are responsible for prosecuting all offenses
against the United States, defending the United States in all civil
actions, and collecting debts owed to the federal government.4
United States Attorneys investigate and prosecute criminal
activities such as violent crime, drug trafficking, public corruption,
and domestic and international terrorism.5
Since September 11, 2001, the war on terror has been the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) first priority.6 Assistant U.S.
Attorneys (AUSAs) are largely responsible for the investigation,
indictment, and prosecution of terror suspects.7 An AUSA may use
a wide variety of traditional investigative tools to help construct a
case.8 After September 11th, the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT Act) greatly broadened the
powers of federal law enforcement officials.9 The DOJ has shown,
3

Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1573, 1576 (2003).
4
28 U.S.C. § 547 (2004).
5
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., U.S. ATTORNEYS: PERFORMANCE-BASED
INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING 2 (2004) [hereinafter Initiatives Report], available
at http://www.gao.gov/new/items/d04422.pdf.
6
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AT WORK 3 (July 2004) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act at Work], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/patriot0704.pdf (quoting Attorney General
John Ashcroft who stated in a speech given on Oct. 25, 2001, “[t]he fight against
terrorism is the first and overriding priority of the Department of Justice”).
7
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-90.100, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ foia_reading_room/usam/ (last visited Nov.
26, 2004). The manual states “prosecution of national security cases will
ordinarily be handled by the USAO in the district where venue lies . . . the
Assistant Attorney General shall retain general supervisory authority over the
conduct of the case from its inception until its conclusion, including appeal.” Id.
8
For instance, an AUSA may gather witnesses through offers of leniency
or through compulsion orders requiring witnesses to testify.
9
For example, an AUSA may now request roving wiretaps (that include
multiple phones or communication devices) or delayed notification warrants,
and can also use greater surveillance records. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001). See also PATRIOT Act at Work, supra note
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at least in one instance, that such increased investigatory and
prosecutorial powers may involve too much responsibility to
adequately supervise.
The story of the “Detroit sleeper cell” provides an example of
the misuse of prosecutorial powers in a terrorism case. In June
2003, Karim Koubriti and Abdel Ilah El Maroudi were found
guilty of conspiring to provide material support and resources to
terrorism efforts.10 Then-acting Attorney General John Ashcroft
stated that the convictions were a victory and that “every victory in
the courtroom brings us closer to our ultimate goal of victory in the
war on terrorism.”11 Soon after, the defendants, in their motion to
set aside the verdict and for a new trial, alleged that the
Government suppressed evidence, knowingly used false testimony,
and improperly vouched for and bolstered the testimony of
witnesses.12 During a hearing on the motion, Judge Rosen
discovered that the prosecution did withhold exculpatory and
impeachment material and thus ordered the Government to conduct
a review to determine whether there were additional suppressed
documents.13 On September 2, 2004, the DOJ issued a sixty-page
report on the prosecutorial misconduct of Richard Convertino, the
AUSA who spearheaded the prosecution. The DOJ report also
recommended that the court dismiss the terrorism charges against
Karim Koubriti and Abdel Ilah El Maroudi without prejudice.14
6.
10

Another co-defendant, Ahmed Hannan, was found guilty of conspiracy
to commit immigration document fraud. Barry Tarlow, Rico Report: Terrorism
Prosecution Implodes: The Detroit ‘Sleeper Cell’ Case, 29 CHAMPION 61, 68
(2005).
11
Ashcroft on Detroit Terror Case, supra note 1.
12
See Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get it Wrong—Anatomy of the
Detroit Terror Case, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 338-39 (2005) (detailing the
events leading up to the dismissal of terrorism charges).
13
See id.
14
The government investigation was the result of a post-trial court order
issued after government lawyers in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit brought
evidence to the attention of defense counsel. See United States v. Koubriti, 336
F. Supp. 2d 676, 678-81 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (dismissing the terrorism-related
charges in Count I of the indictment because of “pervasive” prosecutorial
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After a nine-month investigation, the DOJ report concluded
that the “prosecution failed to disclose matters, which viewed
collectively, were ‘material’ to the defense.”15 The DOJ
memorandum addressed the many missteps in the prosecution’s
disclosure and the prosecution’s misrepresentation of the facts.16
The DOJ report, however, failed to explain how one prosecutor
was permitted to argue fault-ridden theories in such a highlypublicized case.
Later investigations by the New York Times uncovered the
DOJ’s complicit nature in the wrongful handling of the Detroit
case.17 Convertino may have been a rogue lawyer in part, but
according to an internal memorandum, the DOJ knew that the
evidence was weak to begin with and charged the men with “the
hope that the case might get better.”18 Furthermore, senior DOJ
officials believed that Convertino was withholding information
from the DOJ, but the only effort made to rectify the matter was to
“rein” Convertino in.19 Nonetheless, these attempts at departmental
oversight of Convertino failed.20
In the post-9/11 world, there are two major elements
contributing to the increase in terrorism prosecutions. The first
element is the government’s goal of obtaining terrorism
misconduct). The terrorism-related charges were dismissed based on findings
resulting from the post-trial investigations of both the Department of Justice and
the court. Id. at 681. The court reviewed documents, both classified and
unclassified, before dismissing the conviction. Id.
15
Government’s Consolidated Response Concurring in the Defendant’s
Motions for a New Trial and Government’s Motion to Dismiss Count One
Without Prejudice and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, at 3, United
States v. Koubriti, No. 01-CR-80778 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2004).
16
Id.
17
Danny Hakim & Eric Lichtblau, Trial & Errors: The Detroit Terror
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at A1.
18
Id. (quoting Barry Sabin, the DOJ’s counterterrorism chief).
19
Id. “Senior Justice Department officials said in interviews that they did
not believe Mr. Convertino was sharing important information with them . . .
[o]ne official said Washington had directed supervisors in Detroit to ‘rein him
in’ before the trial started.” Id.
20
See id.
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convictions to demonstrate its ability to achieve results in the war
on terror.21 The second element, which is also a tool of the first, is
the PATRIOT Act’s broadened definition of terrorism.22 Federal
prosecutors may now criminally charge those who provide material
support to terrorists.23 This not only includes those who harbor
terrorists, but also individuals who supply technical support such
as expert advice and false documentation.24 These political
elements of the nation’s fight against terrorism create a heightened
incentive to prosecute terror suspects, thus leading to a greater risk
of improper conduct on the part of prosecutors.
With the many terrorism cases that lie ahead, it is time to
reevaluate prosecutorial accountability.25 Notwithstanding many
21

Terrorism cases may also increase in light of the government’s new
strategy of charging “enemy combatants” such as Jose Padilla. See Padilla v.
Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584-85 (4th Cir. 2005). Beginning in May 2002, the
government held American citizen Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant. He was
detained on such charges as taking up arms against the United States in
Afghanistan and conspiring to perform domestic terrorism. In February 2005,
the District Court for South Carolina decided Padilla’s habeas corpus petition.
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 678 (D.S.C. 2005). The district court held that the
government could not indefinitely detain an American citizen without charging
him with a crime. Id. at 692. The Fourth Circuit reversed shortly after, and
Padilla petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d
386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005). In an attempt to short circuit a Supreme Court review
of the issue, the government requested the transfer of Padilla to civilian
authorities so that he may be prosecuted for alleged offenses that were different
from those offenses he was militarily held for. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d
582, 583-84 (4th Cir. 2005). The government also requested the withdrawal of
the Fourth Circuit decision reversing the district court. Id. The Fourth Circuit
denied the government’s request. Id. The Supreme Court granted the transfer,
but will still consider Padilla’s petition for certiorari. Hanft v. Padilla, No.
05A578, 2006 WL 14310 (Jan. 4, 2006).
22
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (2001).
23
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2005). The statute prohibits any person from
providing “currency . . . lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, . . . weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, . . . and
other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.” Id.
24
Id.
25
See Trac: FBI, “FBI Criminal Referrals for Prosecution Declining,”
http://trac.syr.edu/tracfbi/latest/current/. Since 9/11, while general criminal
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generations of laws governing prosecutorial conduct, the current
system for oversight is insufficient. Federal prosecutorial conduct
is regulated by the U.S. Constitution, civil liability, the McDade
Amendment of 1998,26 the DOJ United States Attorneys’ Manual
and the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Yet,
these safeguards are insufficient to prevent misconduct in terrorism
cases that invoke the mantra of national security.
Part I of this Note details the federal prosecutor’s role in the
war on terror. Part II examines current judicial and statutory
restraints on federal prosecutorial conduct and discusses
professional standards.27 Part III details the shortcomings of those
restraints, which are especially troublesome given the deference
prosecutors are granted in terrorism cases. The lack of attorney
sanctions by the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility will
also be discussed. Part IV will urge a reformulation of OPR
standards and a reconsideration of the Federal Prosecutors Ethics
Act (proposed in 1999) as a foundation for reform, and suggest that
substantial and public sanctions may be appropriate to ensure
accountability.28
I. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS & THE WAR ON TERROR
Since the end of 2001, the top strategic goal of the DOJ has
been to “protect America against the threat of terrorism.”29 Under
the auspices of the Attorney General, the FBI and DOJ have
increasingly focused on the investigation of terrorist activity and
the prosecution of terrorism suspects.30 The ninety-four United
enforcement actions have declined, criminal matters classified as terrorism, antiterrorism and internal security were up from 390 in fiscal year 2001 to 2,534 in
fiscal year 2003. Id.
26
Citizens Protection Act (McDade Amendment), 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2004)
(subjecting AUSAs to a state’s attorney ethics guidelines).
27
Professional restraints include the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the DOJ U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.
28
Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999).
29
2003 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP., § 1.2-1.3A, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ ar2003/p2sg1.htm.
30
Id.
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States Attorneys’ offices, with approximately 5000 attorneys, have
a large role in the DOJ’s anti-terrorism strategy.31 The offices “are
part of a national network that coordinates the dissemination of
information and the development of a preventive, investigative,
and prosecutorial strategy among federal law enforcement
agencies, primary state and local police forces, and other
appropriate state agencies in each of the ninety-four federal
judicial districts.”32
The increased emphasis on terrorism prosecution is highlighted
by disclosed DOJ statistics. In 2003, the FBI investigated 23,785
terrorist cases, more than double the number investigated in
2001.33 This increase correlates to the increase in terrorism and
terrorism-related convictions between 2001 and 2003. In 2001, the
DOJ reported just twenty-nine convictions for terrorism and
terrorism-related activity, whereas in 2003 the number swelled to
103 convictions for terrorism and 558 convictions for terrorismrelated activity.34 Furthermore, according to DOJ fiscal year
forecasts, the Department expects to increase the number of hours
and amount of money spent on preventing terrorism and protecting
America.35
United States Attorneys’ Offices are faced with increasing
pressure to demonstrate achievements in prosecuting terror cases.36
In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA), the DOJ must set goals and objectives in order to
measure performance.37 For the fiscal year 2005, the DOJ’s first
31

Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 3.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. Terrorism convictions include “offenses involving acts (including
threats or conspiracies to engage in such acts) that are violent or dangerous to
human life and that appear motivated by an intent to coerce, intimidate, or
retaliate against a government or civilian population.” Terrorism-related
activities include “terrorism-related hoaxes and terrorist financing.” Id.
35
Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 28-29. The majority of the 2005
budget ($1.5 billion) will be applied to “enforc[ing] federal laws and
represent[ing] the rights and interests of the American people.” Id. at 28.
36
Id. at 4-5.
37
Government Performance and Results Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 306 (2004);
32
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strategic goal was to prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s
security.38 Thus, emphasis is on indicators that measure any
progress towards accomplishing this goal.
The DOJ has developed performance measures for U.S.
Attorneys in particular, and the Executive Office of United States
Attorneys (EOUSA)39 is working towards implementing tools to
measure individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.40 For instance, in the
fiscal year 2005 congressional budget submission, the DOJ
included the percentage of cases favorably resolved.41 With respect
to the goal of protecting America against the threat of terrorism,
this specifically means the number of terrorism-related
convictions.42 Although the theory of such results-oriented
performance-based measurements is to promote efficiency,
productivity, and accountability, a potential byproduct of requiring
such measurements is to encourage prosecutions despite possible
weakness in the evidence. This is a serious consequence because a
prosecutor’s obligation as a “minister of justice” rests on his or her
ability to weigh evidence to ensure that it is sufficient to warrant
prosecution.43

Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that the GPRA requires agencies to
establish goals, measure performance, and report accomplishments annually).
38
Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 1.
39
Executive Office for United States Attorneys Home Page, http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa (noting that the Executive Office of the United States
Attorneys was created on April 6, 1953 as a liaison between DOJ and the ninetyfour U.S. Attorneys’ Offices nationwide) (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
40
Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 5.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 31.
43
Green, supra note 3, at 1587-88. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, R. 3.8(f) cmt. 1 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45, 51-52 (1991). The result of improper prosecutions in terrorism cases is even
more worrisome when one considers that juries are likely to be swayed towards
conviction if the defendant is charged with a crime that implicates a serious
national security risk.
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II. CURRENT OVERSIGHT
Since 2001, there has been a change in culture at the DOJ that
has trickled down to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The pressure to
prosecute terrorism cases and the greater prosecutorial discretion
tests the safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct. In order to
critically assess those safeguards, this section will briefly review
the judicial, statutory, and professional standards that protect
against misconduct.
A. Judicial Constraints
There are several courtroom constraints on the prosecutor’s
conduct. First, federal courts may compensate defendants for any
due process violations on the part of the prosecutor: judges may
suppress evidence, censure prosecutors or dismiss indictments or
trials. Second, federal defendants who are subjected to
prosecutorial misconduct may have a cause of action for a civil
claim. Claims alleging a constitutional rights violation may be
brought against a state prosecutor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
corresponding Bivens claims against federal prosecutors; however,
prosecutors acting within their prosecutorial duties may be immune
from such liability in whole or in part.44 Third, a claim can be
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).45 Lastly, the
Hyde Amendment,46 a federal statute, allows for awards of
attorneys’ fees when there is a finding of prosecutorial misconduct.
During a trial, due process concerns may protect defendants
against prosecutorial misconduct. For instance, courts may
disadvantage a prosecutor who fails to disclose exculpatory
44

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). A Bivens claim is a suit “brought directly under
the Constitution against federal officials.” Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
45
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2005).
46
Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 619, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519
(1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C § 3006, historical and statutory notes) [hereinafter
Hyde Amendment].
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evidence, uses false evidence, or makes improper arguments.47 The
suppression of exculpatory evidence or the use of perjured
testimony by a prosecutor may lead to a dismissal of an indictment
or a new trial.48 Findings of egregious prosecutorial misconduct
could warrant overturning a conviction.49 Furthermore, the
“relational paradigm” between prosecutors and judges deters
misconduct.50 Prosecutors who repeatedly appear before the same
judges have a reputation to uphold, and thus the threat of
reputational sanctions act to ensure that prosecutors adhere to due
process.51 But aside from prejudicing the government’s case
against the wronged defendant or informally rebuking the
prosecutor, a prosecutor who acts improperly is unlikely to be
47

See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79
N.C. L. REV. 721, 732 (2001) (referencing the areas in which prosecutorial
misconduct does occur).
48
See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (E.D. Mich.
2004); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (mandating a new trial
because prosecutor withheld evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt
for the jury). Under the exclusionary rule, incriminating evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause may be excluded
from trial. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary rule is used
to deter unlawful police conduct but that it is not a constitutional right and thus
the rule will only apply to evidence that may incriminate the victim of the
search).
49
In a racketeering case involving 175 counts of criminal activity and
thirty-five defendants, the convictions were overturned when the judges learned
that the prosecutor had not disclosed exculpatory material. JIM MCGEE & BRIAN
DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE 219 (1996). The Chief U.S. District Court judge in
Chicago, Marvin Aspen, stated that he regretted overturning the convictions
because of the “misguided zeal” of a prosecutor who was “willing to abandon
fundamental notions of due process of law and deviate from acceptable
standards of prosecutorial conduct.” Id.
50
Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating Government
Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 461 (2005)
“Individual line prosecutors appear on an ongoing basis before federal district
judges. They must act in a way that preserves their credibility and reputation if
they hope to secure the district judge’s good will in a range of determinations
such as detention hearings, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing.” Id.
51
Id. at 459-62.
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directly liable to the defendant unless the defendant brings a proper
civil suit against the prosecutor.
Defendants have a statutory right to bring suits against
prosecutors for constitutional violations. Under Title 42 U.S.C. §
1983, every person who acts under state law to deprive another of
“any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”52 Although
this statute appears to afford wronged defendants a right to redress
for prosecutorial misconduct, the statute is applied narrowly to
prosecutors because of prosecutors’ unique role in the criminal
justice system.
To effectively maintain the criminal justice system, it is
necessary to provide both state and federal prosecutors a certain
degree of immunity from civil actions.53 Without immunity, the
constant threat of personal liability could temper a prosecutor’s
effectiveness in seeking justice.54 Furthermore, a prosecutor could
suffer from a deluge of frivolous misconduct claims, imposing
“unique and intolerable burdens,” upon an honest prosecutor.55
The leading case regarding prosecutorial immunity is Imbler v.
Pachtman.56 In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a state
52

42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section works “in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities and defenses.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
418 (1976).
53
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424.
54
Id. at 424-25.
55
Id. at 425-26 (referring to the duty of state prosecutors).
56
Id. at 409. Paul Imbler was convicted of murder, but was later granted
habeas relief because of the prosecutor’s use of false testimony and suppression
of evidence on the part of the police. Imbler sued the prosecutor under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 but despite the grant of the writ of habeas relief—which recognized the
prosecutor’s misconduct—the Supreme Court held that prosecutors must have
absolute immunity in order to ensure the proper function of the criminal justice
system. Id. at 415-16, 426. The Court defined the difference between “absolute
immunity” and “qualified immunity” as follows: “[a]n absolute immunity
defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions were within the scope
of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon
the circumstances and motivation of his actions, as established by the evidence
at trial.” Id. at 419 n.13.
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prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 if the acts are within the scope of his prosecutorial duties—
specifically, conduct related to seeking prosecution and presenting
the case.57 The Court reasoned that “attaining the [criminal justice]
system’s goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires
that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in
the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence.”58 The
Court further stated that the potential for personal liability may
influence a prosecutor’s decision to introduce relatively
questionable witnesses or evidence, thus limiting the trier-of-fact’s
ability to weigh all the evidence in determining guilt or
innocence.59 The Court, however, recognized that such immunity
leaves the defendant without “civil redress against a prosecutor
whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty,” but
the Court reasoned that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is
protected by the “remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate
review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral
remedies.”60 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the public is
not left powerless because a prosecutor may be criminally
punished for willful deprivations of constitutional rights under 18
U.S.C. § 242 or disciplined by a bar association.61 Yet, as will be
57

See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). See also Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (upholding prosecutor’s immunity from liability for
conduct in probable-cause hearing but asserting partial immunity with respect to
giving legal advice to police officers during investigations). Although Imbler
and Burns address § 1983 claims brought against state prosecutors, the same
analysis is used to determine the liability of a federal prosecutor under a Bivens
claim. Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 820 (1996).
58
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 427.
61
Id. at 429. See also 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2005). The statute provides for
criminal punishment for willful deprivation or violation of Constitutional rights
or federal law under color of law. It does not provide a private right of action.
For the most part, this statute is used to punish police brutality. See, e.g., Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97
(1951). In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997), the Supreme Court
held that the defendant should only be criminally prosecuted if he had “fair
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discussed in Part III, such protections may be ineffective,
especially in cases involving national security.
The Supreme Court further developed the doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity in Burns v. Reed.62 In Burns, the Court
distinguished advocatory duties from investigatory duties and
refused to extend absolute immunity to the latter.63 The Court
specifically held that giving legal advice to the police prior to the
initiation of a prosecution was not an activity protected by absolute
immunity.64 The Court has defined investigatory activities as those
usually performed by a detective or police officer that occur prior
to the establishment of probable cause for arrest.65 Advocatory
activities, on the other hand, are related to the “initiation of a
prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case in court, or actions
preparatory for these functions.”66
A defendant may also sue the United States as sovereign under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA provides that the
United States may be held liable, with exceptions, for the negligent
or wrongful acts of government employees.67 The FTCA has a
“discretionary function exception” granting immunity to

warning” that his conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. The “fair
warning test” is similar to the “qualified immunity test” used in civil actions in
which liability attaches only if “‘[t]he contours of the right [violated are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.’” Id. at 270 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)). If this interpretation is applied to prosecutorial misconduct
during the trial phase, it can be argued that the prosecutor would have no fair
warning that he would be criminally liable under § 242. The utilization of § 242
as a way to discipline prosecutorial misconduct during trial may not be a
realistic protection.
62
500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1993); Moore v. Valder,
65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2004) (holding that the
United States may be liable because the federal prosecutor used inappropriate
investigative techniques when he intimidated and coerced witnesses).
66
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278.
67
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2005).
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prosecutors performing advocatory duties;68 qualified immunity
only applies when the prosecutor’s conduct goes beyond these
duties.69 Acts such as “deciding whether to prosecute, assessing a
witness’s credibility to ensure that he is giving an accurate and
complete account of what he knows, identifying the evidence to
submit to the grand jury and determining whether information is
‘exculpatory’ and ‘material’” have been defined as discretionary
and thus fall within the exception to liability.70 Thus, there is a
similar analysis for determining whether the United States will be
liable under the FTCA for the wrongdoing of a prosecutor and
whether a prosecutor will be civilly liable under § 1983 or a Bivens
action, namely, when the prosecutor is performing advocatory
duties there is absolute immunity, and when he or she is
performing investigative duties, qualified immunity applies.
The 1997 Hyde Amendment is another possible mechanism for
redressing victims of prosecutorial misconduct.71 Under the
Amendment, Congress enables a federal court to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs to an acquitted defendant “where the
court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious,
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless such circumstances make such an
award unjust.”72 Few parties have met this bar. The DOJ’s Office
of Professional Responsibility (OPR) reviews claims brought
under the Hyde Amendment. Between 1997 and 2000, there were
95 claims filed under the statute.73 Defendants prevailed in two
cases and settled in two cases.74
In addition to potential civil liability for constitutional
68

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2005).
Moore, 65 F.3d at 217.
70
Id. at 197.
71
Hyde Amendment, supra note 46.
72
Id.
73
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE’S OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 41 (2001)
[hereinafter
GAO
FOLLOW-UP
ON
OPR],
available
at
http:www.gao.gov/new.items/d01135r.pdf. “According to OPR officials, OPR
reviews every claim filed under the Hyde Amendment to determine if any facts
or issues arising from Hyde-related matters warrant inquiry by OPR.” Id. at 41.
74
Id.
69
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violations, federal prosecutors may be disciplined for violations of
professional standards set forth by state bar associations and
internal standards of the DOJ. The OPR oversees the professional
conduct of federal prosecutors and investigates allegations of
misconduct.
B. McDade Amendment and Professional Standards
Analysis of the statutory professional standards for federal
prosecutors begins with the McDade Amendment of 1998.75 The
McDade Amendment subjects U.S. Attorneys to state laws and
rules and local federal court rules regarding professional
standards.76 The movement towards the McDade Amendment
dates back to a controversy over a 1989 memorandum from thenAttorney General Richard Thornburgh.77 The memorandum was
issued in response to the Second Circuit case of United States v.
Hammad.78 The AUSA investigating a Medicaid and mail fraud
case against the Hammad brothers directed an informant to meet
with the suspect to gather evidence. The court held that because the
Hammads had already retained counsel, and because the informant
was acting as the alter-ego of the prosecutor, the prosecutor
violated an American Bar Association Disciplinary Rule, which
states that an attorney may not contact a person represented by
counsel without the knowledge and permission of that person’s
counsel.79
75

28 U.S.C. § 530B (2004).
Id. (providing that “[a]n attorney for the Government shall be subject to
the State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same
extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State”). A majority of
states have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004).
77
Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Richard Thornburgh to all Dep’t of Just.
Litigators (June 8, 1989), quoted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486-90
(D.N.M. 1992) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum].
78
858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
79
Id. at 840. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. DR7-104(A)(1) (1983). DR 7104 states: “During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
76
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The DOJ feared that following the decision in United States v.
Hammad,80 the Second Circuit’s extension of the “no contacts”
rule to pre-indictment criminal investigations would hamper
undercover investigations.81 The Attorney General disseminated a
memorandum stating that neither DR 7-104 nor the ABA’s parallel
Model Rule prohibited “contact with a represented individual in
the course of authorized law enforcement activity.”82 Further, the
memorandum stated that the DOJ would resist on Supremacy
Clause grounds any disciplinary action against federal prosecutors
by state authorities pertaining to this issue.83
Former Attorney General Janet Reno, Thornburgh’s successor,
issued a formal regulation that codified the Thornburgh
memorandum.84 The regulation was viewed as an attempt by the
DOJ to preempt the field of attorney discipline.85 The ABA
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is
authorized by law to do so.” Id. Compare with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983) “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.” Id.
80
Hammad, 858 F.2d at 834.
81
See Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade
Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2083-84 (2000). But see Hammad, 858
F.2d at 840 (rejecting a bright-line rule regarding the application of the no
contacts rule to pre-indictment investigations and limiting its holding to the facts
of the case).
82
Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 77.
83
Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade
Amendment, supra note 81, at 2084-85 (citing In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 483,
489 (D.N.M. 1992)).
84
See 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1999). The regulation gave the DOJ greater authority
over the rules regulating its attorneys. Id.
85
See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics
Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L.
REV. 923, 961-62 (1996) (noting that the DOJ allowed for public comments
regarding the proposed regulation and that those comments addressed the
dubiousness of DOJ authority to create special rules for prosecutors).
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Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued an opinion addressing the new regulation.86 The opinion
stated:
[W]hen an agency promulgates regulations purporting to
authorize conduct in derogation of other law, those
regulations must be grounded in a statute which
contemplates regulations of the kind issued. A general
grant of regulatory authority to an agency is not sufficient
to support the issuance of regulations that permit what
other law forbids.87
Courts also reacted negatively to the DOJ’s mandate.88 In
United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, investigative
agents of the DOJ made ex parte contact with present and former
lower-level employees of McDonnell Douglas Corporation without
the consent of the corporation’s counsel.89 In response to a
McDonnell Douglas motion, the district court ordered a protective
order barring such ex parte contacts because they violated the
Supreme Court of Missouri’s no-contact rule.90 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed; the court found no statutory authority for the DOJ’s
creation of a rule that exempted federal prosecutors from local
ethics rules.91 The court held the regulation invalid and without
federal preemption power.
In addition to the local and state ethics rules, prosecutors must
also abide by internal guidelines established by the DOJ and
86

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396

(1995).
87

Id.
See United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d
1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that ex parte contacts by the federal
prosecutors were barred by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4-4.2 and that 28
C.F.R. § 77 (repealed 1999) was invalid and thus without power to supercede
the local rule). See also United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C.
1993) (stating that the Thornburgh memorandum was merely the “unilateral
statement of Justice Department policy by the Attorney General”).
89
132 F.3d at 1253.
90
Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ethical rules have been adopted by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Id.
91
Id. at 1257.
88
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enforced by the OPR. The United States Attorneys’ Manual
(Attorneys’ Manual) dictates the policies, procedures and standards
of conduct for prosecutors.92 The Attorneys’ Manual offers
guidelines for discretionary decisions such as initiating federal
criminal prosecutions,93 communicating with represented parties,94
and declining criminal prosecutions.95 The Attorney’s Manual
provides only internal guidelines and does not affect prosecutors’
immunity defenses to suit because it makes clear that it does not
“create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
any party in any matter civil or criminal.”96
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct, § 1-4.100 of the
Attorney’s Manual mandates that department employees should
report any “non-frivolous allegation of misconduct” to the
“appropriate supervisor.”97 The supervisor “shall evaluate whether
the misconduct at issue is serious” and if so, shall report the
allegation to the OPR and to legal counsel in the Executive Office
of United States Attorneys (EOUSA).98 This framework
establishes three levels of assessment: the complaining employee
must determine the seriousness of possible misconduct by a coworker, the supervisor then assesses the seriousness of the conduct,
and finally the OPR and EOUSA investigate the allegations.99
Statements by a judge that allege prosecutorial misconduct are
also subjected to a hierarchical internal review.100 First, department
attorneys are required to report to their supervisors “any statements
by a judge or magistrate indicating a belief that misconduct by a
Department employee has occurred, or taking under submission a
claim of misconduct.”101 Second, the supervisor is to report to the
92

U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.100.
Id. at § 9-2.030.
94
Id. at § 9-13.200.
95
Id. at § 9-2.020.
96
Id. at § 1.1.00.
97
Id. at §1-4.100.
98
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.100.
99
Id.
100
Id. at § 1-4.120
101
Id. at § 1-4.210.
93
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OPR any “evidence or non-frivolous allegation of serious
misconduct.”102
The OPR is responsible for reviewing and investigating
allegations of professional misconduct or violations of internal
guidelines by a federal prosecutor.103 First, the OPR will
commence an inquiry to determine if the allegation is credible by
speaking with the attorney in question.104 Second, the OPR will
determine which inquiries are worth investigating further and
assign an Assistant Counsel who will conduct interviews of the
attorney, the complainant and any other witnesses.105 Lastly, the
Assistant Counsel prepares a report of the findings and
characterizes any prosecutorial misconduct into two levels:
intentional misconduct or reckless disregard of professional
obligations.106 A recommendation of a range of disciplinary action

102

Id. (emphasis added).
See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, DEP’T OF JUST.: INFO. ON OFFICE OF
PROF’L RESP.’S OPERATIONS (2000) [hereinafter GAO INFO ON OPR]. See also
Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 167, 186 (2004). The former chief
counsel of the OPR, Michael Shaheen, once stated, “We believe that we are the
only component in the department that is the ultimate check on behalf of the
Attorney General against prosecutors and misconduct by them . . . and abusing
the machinery that they have at their disposal, which is awesome.” MCGEE &
DUFFY, supra note 49 (quoting Shaheen).
104
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 6-7.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 12.
An attorney engages in intentional misconduct when (1) the attorney
acts with the purpose of violating an obligation imposed by law,
applicable rule of professional conduct, or department policy or
regulation or (2) acts knowing that the natural and probable
consequences of his or her action is to violate the obligation. An
attorney acts in reckless disregard of an obligation when the attorney
(1) knows or should know of the obligation, (2) knows or should know
that his or her conduct involves a substantial likelihood that the
obligation will be violated, and (3) nonetheless engages in the conduct,
which is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
Id.
103
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is also prepared.107 The head of the attorney’s office enforces the
disciplinary actions recommended by the OPR.108 If for any reason
the head of the office wishes to deviate from the OPR’s
recommendations, he or she must request approval from the
Deputy Attorney General.109
When misconduct is found to be intentional, the state bar
where the attorney is admitted is notified.110 Between 1997 and
March 2000, forty of the forty-nine cases of prosecutorial
misconduct were reported to a state bar association.111 During that
same period, the OPR received 3913 complaints.112
Rather than finding professional misconduct, the OPR may
find that the attorney used “poor judgment.”113 A poor judgment
finding does not result in OPR disciplinary action; however, the
matter may be referred to the head of the office where the attorney
works to determine if in-house disciplinary measures are
appropriate.114
III. DEFICIENCY OF CURRENT OVERSIGHT
A. Heightened Due Process Concerns and Greater Power and
Discretion for AUSAs
Terrorism cases, which involve national security, confidential
information, and publicity, produce a different dynamic for the
prosecutor and the judge as overseer. First, due process protections
107

Id. at 7.
Id. at 12.
109
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 12.
110
Id. at 13.
111
Id. at 8.
112
Id.
113
Id. An attorney exercises poor judgment when, “faced with alternative
courses of actions, the attorney chooses a course of action that is in marked
contrast to the action that the department may reasonably expect an attorney
exercising good judgment to take.” Id.
114
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 13.
108
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during trial are tempered by the high stakes involved. Second, the
extrinsic pressures on line-prosecutors to successfully prosecute
these cases may encourage improper conduct. Third, the tools used
in terrorism cases, particularly the Classified Information
Procedures Act,115 the Special Administrative Measures statutes116
and the Freedom of Information Act,117 lessen the judge’s and the
defense attorneys’ abilities to oversee prosecutorial conduct and
assail attorney-client privilege.
In terrorism cases, which involve matters of national security,
judicial oversight may be limited.118 Judges are likely to be
deferential to the government’s position when determining a due
process violation.119 Additionally, with limited disclosure of
evidence, certain types of abuse may be particularly worrisome,
such as: abuse of prosecutorial discretion in indictment,
misrepresentations to the court, improper remarks to the grand jury
or during trial, and failure to comply with federal requirements
regarding the discovery and disclosure of evidence.120
115

18 U.S.C.S. app. 1-16 (2005).
Prevention of Acts of Violence & Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2004);
National Security Cases, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2 (2004).
117
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
118
Contrary to the theory that the judiciary usually applies deference to the
government position, Attorney General John Ashcroft, in a speech to the
Federalist Society, noted that “intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing
of presidential determinations” are putting national security at risk in this “time
of war.” Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Decries Court Rulings; Second-Guessing Bush on
Security Raises Risk, He Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2004, at A06.
119
Peter Marguiles, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency,
Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383,
399-402 (2004). See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)
(2004) (holding that the district court should have applied deference to the
government’s security interests when the district court allowed Hamdi’s habeas
petition which questioned his status as enemy combatant) rev’d. 542 U.S. 507
(2004). See generally Heidee Stoller, et al, Developments in Law and Policy:
The Costs of Post 9-11 National Security Strategy, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
197, 224-33 (2004).
120
See generally Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 469-84
(2005).
116
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Furthermore, the external pressures involved in terrorism cases
may lead a prosecutor to disregard the threat of reputational
sanctions.121 Top level officials at the DOJ, in particular former
Attorney General Ashcroft and Attorney General Gonzales, have
pursued terrorism cases with a particular public zeal. A prosecutor
may choose to subvert professional and ethical rules to win his or
her case out of fear that losing would not only be a loss in the
courtroom but a loss in thwarting terrorism generally.
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)122
diminishes oversight of prosecutorial conduct because it limits
access to the government’s evidence and witnesses.123 Under
CIPA, the government may move the court to redact classified
material from potentially discoverable documents or to “substitute
either a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified
information would tend to prove or a summary of the
information.”124 As a result, the prosecution’s evidence can largely
go un-reviewed by the court and defense counsel. Without such
review, an important safeguard against misrepresentations of
evidence by the prosecutor is debilitated.125 The beyond-areasonable doubt standard “arguably suffice[s] to protect the
innocent,”126 but where the evidence is largely comprised of
classified materials, there can be an unusual reliance on the
prosecutor’s statements and presentation of the facts which limits
the defense counsel’s ability to present a proper defense.127
In an ongoing terrorism case, United States v. Aref & Hossein,
121

Id. at 465-69. See supra Part II.A.
18 U.S.C.S. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2005).
123
See Cameron Stracher, Eyes Tied Shut: Litigating For Access Under
CIPA in the Government’s “War on Terror,” 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 173, 185
(2004).
124
Id. at 184.
125
See Zacharias, supra note 43, at 51-52 (“[The adversarial system allows]
attorneys to keep an eye on one another and on the judge to make sure that they
all perform their assigned roles in proper and ethical fashion.”).
126
Id. at 57.
127
See Hanft v. Padilla, 432 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 2005) (alluding to
possible misrepresentations by the government in its arguments for maintaining
Padilla’s “enemy combatant” status).
122
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the prosecution invoked CIPA to prevent the release of certain
classified information.128 Originally, the prosecution proposed
limited defense access to classified information and only under the
supervision of a DOJ security employee serving under the Court.129
The judge later held that the defense counsel would have access to
the classified information at any time, but only in certain secured
areas. The court also held that the DOJ security employee would
be prohibited from listening to defense counsels’ conversations and
from reporting to the prosecution which materials defense counsel
viewed.130 Furthermore, the judge required the prosecution to
present, in an in camera hearing, the classified information and the
“security significance . . . so the court could balance the
defendants’ right to access the material against the Government’s
interest in non-disclosure.” 131 Although the judge in this case did
recognize that the proposed CIPA request should be limited, the
element of deference to the government’s assessment of the
security significance is likely to remain in future terrorism cases.132
128

No. 04-CR-402 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 9, 2004). The two defendants are
charged with attempting to launder money for terrorism, providing material
support to a foreign terrorist organization, and importing firearms without a
license. Media sources revealed that a key document, allegedly linking
defendants to terrorists in Iraq, was mistranslated. Brendan Lyons, Extension
Denied in FBI Sting Case, ALB. TIMES UNION, Jan. 15, 2005, at B4.
129
John Caher, Defense Attorneys Get Wide Access in Terrorism Case,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 2004, at col. 6.
130
Id.
131
Id. See generally Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Validity and Construction
of Classified Information Procedures Act, 103 A.L.R. FED. 219, § 2(b) (2006)
“[C]ourts have applied a three step analysis: (1) an inquiry as to whether the
evidence is relevant; (2) if the evidence is relevant, a determination whether it is
material; and (3) a balancing of the defendant’s need for access to the
information in the preparation of his defense against the government’s need to
keep the information from disclosure by reason of its potential harm to national
security interests.” Id.
132
See United States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. Appx. 881, 887 n.5 (4th Cir.
2003) “Intervenors maintain that we need not defer to the classification
decisions of the Government. Implicit in this assertion is a request for us to
review, and perhaps reject, classification decisions made by the executive
branch. This we decline to do.” Id.
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In terrorism cases, the adversarial system, an element in
ensuring a defendant’s due process rights, is vulnerable.133 This
threat is apparent when the government requests “Special
Administrative Measures” (SAMs) for a federal prisoner.134 SAMs
impose specific conditions and restrictions on a prisoner.135 There
can be limits on prisoner communications when “there is a
substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts with
persons could result in death or serious bodily injury to
persons . . . .”136 These limits on communication can apply to
interactions between a defendant and his counsel, thus impinging
on the attorney-client privilege and harmfully affecting the
adversarial system.137
In United States v. Reid, SAMs were imposed to restrict Reid’s
attorney-client privilege.138 The SAMs limited communication
between Reid, pre-cleared defense counsel and defense counsel
staff and third parties.139 Part of the SAMs Restriction Document
required the defense counsel to sign an affirmation acknowledging
receipt of the document.140 Reid’s attorneys informed the
government that they would not sign the affirmation and the
government promptly cut off communication between defense
133

See id.
Prevention of Acts of Violence & Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2004);
National Security Cases, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2 (2004). SAMs may be implemented
when it is reasonably necessary to “prevent disclosure of classified information
upon receiving written certification to the Attorney General by the head of a
member agency of the United States intelligence community that the
unauthorized disclosure of such information would pose a threat to the national
security and that there is a danger that the inmate will disclose such
information.” Id.
135
28 C.F.R §§ 501.2, 501.3.
136
28 C.F.R § 501.3.
137
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d). See generally Marjorie Cohen, The Evisceration
of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2003).
138
214 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002). Richard Reid later pled guilty to
eight offenses. See U.S. v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 620 (1st Cir. 2004).
139
See Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 87-88.
140
See id. at 88.
134
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counsel and Reid.141 To diffuse the conflict between the defense
counsel and the prosecutors, the court held that the SAMs
affirmation was not required of defense counsel.142 The court, after
highlighting the importance of adversarial proceedings, stated that
the affirmation imposed “as a condition of the free exercise of
Reid’s Sixth Amendment right to consult with his attorneys
fundamentally and impermissibly intrudes on the proper role of
defense counsel.”143
Although the court in Reid attempted to protect
communications between the defendant and his counsel, the power
of SAMs and the required attorney affirmations may go unfettered
in other courts. This is particularly worrisome because restrictions
on communication between defense counsel and clients result in
the sacrifice of a proper defense.144 The court in Reid also noted
that affirmations may have a “chilling effect” on defense attorneys
in terrorism cases.145 The court pointed to the case in which
defense attorney Lynne Stewart was charged with violating the
affirmation she had signed when she communicated statements
from her imprisoned client to the press.146 After the Lynne Stewart
conviction, defense attorneys may be tempered in their advocatory
pursuit by the looming threat of criminal liability for violations of
an affirmation agreement.
Furthermore, the fact that defense counsel has limited
communication with his client may influence the behavior of the
prosecutor. For instance, under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the prosecutor is required to “make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense
and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known
141
142
143
144
145
146

2003).

See id.
See id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
See U.S. v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94 (D. Mass. 2002).
Id. at 95.
Id. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y.
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to the prosecutor . . . .”147 But where a prosecutor knows that it is
unlikely defense counsel will be made aware of exculpatory
evidence, the prosecutor may be tempted to not adhere strictly to
the rule.
Relevant information pertaining to a defendant’s case may also
be curtailed by recent restrictions on the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA).148 The objective of FOIA is “to pierce the veil of
administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny.”149 However, under Attorney General John
Ashcroft, a stricter policy of disclosure was implemented.150 The
new policy changed discretionary disclosures: agencies would
have to consider national security, effective law enforcement, and
personal privacy before using its discretion to disclose
information.151
Not only is less information voluntarily disclosed due to the
new policy, but courts have upheld government claims of
exceptions to FOIA when there is a request for information
regarding terrorist suspects.152 Thus, where the government might
147

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 3.8(d) (2003).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Just., 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004)
(holding that the information requested by plaintiffs with respect to detainees
after 9/11 was exempt from FOIA because the records were compiled for
ongoing law enforcement purposes). The circuit court stated, “in the FOIA
context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to
the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial
review.” Id. at 927.
149
Rose v. Dep’t of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (1974).
150
The Attorney General usually issues a policy regarding FOIA at the
beginning of a new administration. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued a memorandum on October 12, 2001, roughly a month after 9/11,
replacing former Attorney General Janet Reno’s 1993 FOIA memorandum and
her policy of “presumption of disclosure.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FREEDOM OF
INFO. ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW ADMIN. POL’Y
GAO-03-981, at 1 (2003).
151
There are nine categories of exemptions to FOIA; however, agencies
may disclose information even if the information could be exempted. Ashcroft’s
policy was to limit this agency discretion. Id.
152
See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 928; ACLU vs. U.S. Dep’t of
148
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normally be compelled by judicial decree to disclose such
information in response to a FOIA request, in terrorism cases,
broader interpretation of FOIA exemptions have sufficiently
thwarted parties’ attempts to discover information that could be
useful to a proper defense.
For example, in Center for National Security Studies v. United
States Department of Justice, the government invoked the law
enforcement exemptions contained in FOIA to bar disclosure of
the names of post-September 11 investigation detainees and their
attorneys and details of the detention/arrest and charges.153 The law
enforcement exemption provides that information may be withheld
if it is “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”154 The court
applied a deferential review of the DOJ’s claim of law enforcement
purpose and held that the terrorism investigation was one of the
DOJ’s “chief ‘law enforcement duties’ at this time.” 155
In summary, the limitations on information and restrictions on
the defense attorneys’ access to their clients and potential
witnesses compromise the process of building a coherent, wellorganized and successful defense. Furthermore, the impartial party
overseeing the adversarial process may also be uninformed.156
Without a defensive counterbalance and a well-informed judicial
overseer, the due process protections against prosecutorial
transgressions are largely defeated.
B. Statutory Guidelines
In addition to the assault on traditional judicial safeguards
against due process violations in terrorism cases, the statutory
framework of the McDade Amendment157 does not enhance the
Just., 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
153
331 F.3d at 922, 928.
154
Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F).
155
Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 926.
156
See United States v. Koubriti, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678-81 (E.D. Mich.
2004).
157
Citizens Protection Act (McDade Amendment), 28 U.S.C. § 530B
(2004).
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protection of a defendant’s rights. Although the Amendment was
enacted with the intention of preventing prosecutorial misconduct,
its application has met much criticism.158 The Amendment does
not adequately reflect the uniqueness of the federal prosecutor’s
role.159 The statute requires that prosecutors abide by “state laws
and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s
duties . . . .”160 Yet, confusion arises when the state rules conflict
with the federal rules of procedure.161 Pursuant to the McDade
Amendment, a prosecutor may be disciplined if he or she follows a
federal rule of procedure that conflicts with a state ethics rule.162
The statute offers no substantive guidance for a prosecutor who
practices in multiple jurisdictions, it is rarely enforced, and when
applied, courts have construed it in an inconsistent manner.
The statute also subjects the prosecutor to state laws and rules
of all the states in which he or she performs attorney duties.163
When assigned to federal cases that involve investigations across
several states, it would be difficult for a prosecutor to abide by the
numerous and conflicting state ethics laws and rules.164 The DOJ
158

See Paula J. Casey, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Why McDade
Should be Repealed, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395 (2002); Federal Prosecutors,
State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, supra note 81. The bill
had weak support initially but it finally passed with little debate as part of a
larger omnibus spending bill.
159
See generally Ryan E. Mick, Note, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act:
Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251 (2001). Mick’s note addresses
the general ethical guidelines and the responsibilities of prosecutors. It also
recommends the proposed Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act (FPEA) over the
McDade Amendment.
160
28 U.S.C.§ 530(B).
161
Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade
Amendment, supra note 81 at 2089 (noting specifically states such as Oregon
and Florida that have adopted a no-contact rule, that bars contact between law
enforcement agents and suspects, and the resulting impediment on the federal
prosecutorial power to use cooperating witnesses, wiretaps and undercover
agents).
162
Id.
163
28 U.S.C. § 530(B).
164
Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulation, and the McDade
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attempted to resolve possible confusion by defining the phrase
“‘where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties’ to mean
either (1) if a case is pending, the rules of ethical conduct adopted
by the court before which the case is pending or (2) if there is no
case pending, the rules of ethical conduct that would be applied by
the attorney’s state of licensure.”165 This interpretation does not
eliminate the problem that arises when the court ethics rules
conflict with the state ethics rules because the statutory text of the
McDade Amendment does not support the DOJ’s interpretation.166
Thus, following McDonnell Douglas, in which the Eighth Circuit
held that DOJ rules do not have federal preemption power, the
DOJ’s interpretation is not likely to be binding on a court
addressing this issue.167
Furthermore, the amendment may be applied inconsistently. In
United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit held
that the McDade Amendment applied to state ethical or
professional rules, but not to procedural or substantive rules that
conflict with federal law.168 The determination, however, between
Amendment, supra note 81 at 2092-93. Prior to the Amendment, prosecutors
were required to abide by the rules of the jurisdiction of the litigation. Id.
165
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 18.
166
See 28 U.S.C. § 530(b); United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998). The Attorney General does
not have the express or implied “authority to exempt lawyers representing the
United States from local rules of ethics which bind all other lawyers appearing
in that court of the United States.” Id.
167
See, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d at 1257.
168
189 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999). See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that even if prosecutors violated a
Florida state rule of professional conduct, such conduct would not warrant
suppression of the resulting evidence because federal evidentiary law and not
state law determines admissibility of evidence); Stern v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) “The potential for conflict between
state and federal law therefore should have been obvious, but section 530B does
not speak to the issue. Instead, Congress directed the Attorney General to fill out
the details of enforcement by regulation . . . These regulations dispel the notion
that section 530B grants states and lower federal courts the power, in the guise
of regulating ethics, to impose strictures that are inconsistent with federal law.”
Id.
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procedural and professional rules is not straightforward.169 The
Court looked to four factors in determining whether a rule is one of
ethical conduct.170 The factors are: (1) whether the professional
conduct is generally recognized by “consensus within the
profession as appropriate;” (2) whether the rule comes in a broad
commandment form; (3) whether the rule is broad and vague in
nature (if so, it is likely to be a rule of ethics because procedural
and substantive laws must be specific); and (4) whether the rule is
directed at the attorney herself and whether members of the
profession “would agree that the violating attorney ought to be
held personally accountable.”171 After applying these factors, the
Court held that a Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct
restricting a prosecutor’s ability to subpoena a lawyer to present
evidence about a past or present client was an ethical rule, and thus
the McDade Amendment would apply and the prosecutor would be
subject to the local rule.172
Enforcement of the Amendment is thereby weakened due to
the confusion created in its application. Despite the McDade
Amendment’s potential for sanctions, in the handful of cases that
exist, courts have not sanctioned the prosecutors; instead opting for
such remedies as reporting the misconduct to the state bar
association for disciplinary proceedings, reporting the incident to
the OPR, or specifically ameliorating the effect of the misconduct
on the case before the court.173
Lastly, the McDade Amendment is not a forceful means of
regulating prosecutorial misconduct because it is rarely enforced
169

See Colo. Sup. Ct., 189 F.3d at 1287-88.
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 1288-89.
173
See U.S. v. Bowman, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1243 (N.D. Ala. 2003);
United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549 (M.D. Penn. 2003) (holding
that suppression of evidence because of possible violation of Pennsylvania’s nocontact rule was not an appropriate remedy in the case and that an alternative
remedy would be to file a complaint with the state disciplinary board); United
States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that any
violation of state bar rules could not provide a basis for a federal court to
suppress testimony that was otherwise admissible).
170
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by state bar associations or by the OPR. Although individual state
bars may hold undisclosed disciplinary hearings on McDade
violations, there are few publicly disclosed violations.174 The OPR
should comply with the McDade Amendment and it does have a
process for determining violations,175 but the OPR does not
maintain information on the number of times the OPR encountered
conflicting ethical rules in its investigations, nor does it report the
frequency of misconduct findings in those instances.176 The lack of
internal OPR information highlights a deficiency in application of
the amendment.
C. The War on Terror Raises Concerns About the DOJ’s
Internal Disciplinary System
The DOJ United States Attorneys’ Manual and the internal
rules of the OPR do not encourage maximum accountability on the
part of federal prosecutors. First, there is a cumbersome reporting
process. Second, OPR investigations rarely result in actual findings
of misconduct that warrant more than a mere verbal censure.
Lastly, when the misconduct does reach a level in which sanctions
other than censure would be appropriate, such as dismissal or
suspension, the OPR does not impose or oversee the punishment,
but relies instead on the individual attorneys’ offices or state bar
associations.
1. Internal Inefficiency in Supervision
The hierarchical structure, although a necessary system, is
encumbered by bureaucracy. For instance, according to the DOJ
174

See GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 18.
The OPR applies state bar rules when investigating possible cases of
prosecutorial misconduct. GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR , supra note 73, at 5. For
example, if an attorney is handling a case in Virginia but is a member of the
Ohio bar, the OPR will assess which of the two states has the most stringent
laws. Id. Thus, once a misconduct investigation is opened, the prosecutor will be
subject to the more stringent laws. Id.
176
Id.
175
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rules with respect to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct during
judicial proceedings, the supervisor must investigate the
prosecutor’s behavior to determine if there is evidence of
misconduct and whether the misconduct is serious enough to report
to the OPR.177 By the time a serious allegation is brought to the
attention of the OPR, it will take up to a year for an OPR
investigation and action.178 This delay leaves the defendant with an
appeal as the only alternative.
In terrorism cases especially, this multi-layer method of
internal attorney supervision is vulnerable to political
grandstanding and inter-office rivalries.179 The national importance
of terrorism cases can make them very attractive to the media,
which increases the pressure felt by the office to be successful.
Thus, in terrorism cases with the potential of high publicity, due
process and conservatism are often subverted by a keen desire to
win a conviction.180 In addition to internal department demands,
strong external political pressure, and a prosecutor’s own
competitive nature, may influence whether a prosecutor closely
adheres to professional and ethical rules.
The Detroit terror case demonstrates the deficiency of such

177

U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, at § 1-4.120. Additionally,
between 1997 and 2000, DOJ employees reported misconduct less each year—
the number of reports declined from 42% of all complaints in 1997 to 25%.
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 9.
178
Id. at 10-11.
179
There are 94 separate U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, each headed by a
president-appointed U.S. Attorney. Although the offices are all under the
direction of the Attorney General, the U.S. Attorneys serve the different
communities to which they are appointed. Thus, there is an inherent
disjointedness and a “degree of tension will always exist between the local and
national mandates of U.S. Attorneys.” Initiatives Report, supra note 5, at 13-14.
180
See Hakim & Lichtblau, supra note 17. See also MCGEE & DUFFY,
supra note 49, at 210 (noting that “new administrations seeking to remedy a
social ill or win favor with voters could and did commandeer the Justice
Department’s authority in ways that put constitutional rights in jeopardy”).
McGee and Duffy detail the DOJ’s “War on Crime”—specifically the drug war
of the 1990s—and the increasing pressure on federal prosecutors to get results.
Id.
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internal oversight.181 During the case, at the highest departmental
level, Attorney General John Ashcroft demonstrated a intense
interest in prosecuting this case.182 Additionally, the Washington
counter-terrorism supervisors were willing to prosecute the weak
case and were fully aware that there was a possibility the
prosecutor in charge was not disclosing evidence.183 At the
immediate level, Convertino’s direct supervisor in the Detroit
office, Keith Corbett, did not rein in Convertino as directed by the
Washington office.184 The lack of supervision by Corbett was
perhaps reactionary: in an email to another top prosecutor, Corbett
stated, “[i]n the 25 years that I have worked for the Department of
Justice, I have never seen anything approaching this level of
micromanagement.”185 It appears that politics and egos fueled the
prosecution which may have led to the mismanagement of the case
and the three-year imprisonment of Mr. Koubriti, one of the four
immigrants accused.186
2. Lack of a Formalized Disciplinary Process
According to the DOJ’s 2003 annual report, the OPR “seeks to
assure Congress, the courts, the state bars and the public generally
that Department attorneys . . . comply with obligations and
standards imposed by law, applicable rules of professional
conduct, or Department regulations or policy.”187 Failures to
181

See Hakim & Lictbau, supra note 17.
See United States v. Koubriti, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 765 (E.D. Mich.
2003) (admonishing Attorney General Ashcroft for public statements to the
press regarding the case in violation of professional rules of conduct and a court
order prohibiting public disclosure of information).
183
See Hakim & Lichtblau, supra note 17.
184
Id.
185
Id. (quoting e-mail from Corbett to Collins). The New York Times
obtained a departmental review of the Detroit office that stated there was an “us
versus them” attitude between Corbett and Joseph Capone, the senior terrorism
prosecutor from Washington.
186
Danny Hakim, Defendant is Released in Detroit Terror Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A16.
187
Att’y Gen., FY 2003: Performance and Accountability Report 1 (2003),
182
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comply with these standards and rules would result in “appropriate
discipline” and referral to state bars.188 According to the one
statistic offered by the DOJ, in 2003, there were ninety-eight
investigations completed; only thirteen resulted in findings of
misconduct.189 There is no information about the disciplinary
process of the thirteen cases because the OPR refers such
misconduct to the individual’s particular Attorneys’ Office.190
Although the OPR supposedly “seeks to assure” the public that
DOJ employees are accountable to rules and laws, the OPR’s track
record of enforcement is lackluster. Between 1997 and 2000, there
were sixty cases in which the OPR found no attorney misconduct
despite serious judicial criticism or findings of misconduct.191
Furthermore, the OPR does not track attorneys who resign or retire
as a result of an OPR investigation.192 Although the OPR may
continue to investigate attorneys who retire, no disciplinary actions
could be imposed.193
Because OPR refers cases of prosecutorial abuse to individual
United States Attorneys’ Offices, there is an inconsistency in
punishments.194 Although the OPR gives punishment
recommendations to each prosecutor’s supervisor, from records
disclosed between 1997 and 2000, supervisors have consistently
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/p2sg1. htm.
188
Id.
189
Id. Before 2001, there were regular, thorough reports by the OPR. This
level of disclosure ended with the 2000 annual report.
190
See id.
191
GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR, supra note 73, at 6. Although the OPR had
originally reported sixty cases in which it found no misconduct despite judicial
findings, it reviewed these cases and determined that in eighteen of those cases,
the OPR did criticize the attorneys’ conduct. Id. at 7.
192
Id. at 3. OPR officials state that it would be impossible to show a causeand-effect relationship between a pending investigation and an attorney’s
resignation. Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 2 “Administrative disciplinary actions that can be taken when
professional misconduct is found can range from oral reprimand to termination
of employment, depending on the circumstances of each case, such as the nature
and severity of the offense and the experience level of the subject attorney.” Id.
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opted to give the minimum punishment recommended.195
OPR’s policy of referring cases of intentional prosecutorial
misconduct is also questionable. As of March 2000, there were
several closed cases dating back to as far as 1996 where the OPR
had not yet informed the appropriate state bar.196
3. Nondisclosure of Attorney Misconduct
Findings of prosecutorial misconduct are often not disclosed in
the attorney’s files.197 If there was an official personnel action,
such as suspension or removal, a form documenting the action
would be permanently placed in the attorney’s folder.198
Otherwise, a written reprimand is placed in the folder for a period
not to exceed three years and the “retention period begins the day
that the reprimand is delivered to the employee, even if it is not
actually filed in the official personnel folder until later.”199 More
importantly, the reprimand is to be removed from the official
personnel folder when the employee leaves the DOJ.200 The OPR
has a confidentiality policy regarding information that it has
received and maintains about DOJ attorneys.201 Thus, it is possible
195

See id. at 17, 22. For example, the recommendation for Brady violations
was oral admonishment to written reprimand. In two separate cases, both
prosecutors received only an oral admonishment. Id. Oral admonishments do not
become a part of the attorney’s personnel file, whereas written reprimands do
become a part of the file. Id.
196
GAO FOLLOW-UP ON OPR, supra note 73, at 9. Specifically, the OPR
records state that, with respect to certain cases of intentional misconduct, “OPR
intends to refer the matter to the appropriate state bar in the form of a public
summary once the summary has been reviewed and approved within Justice’s
prescribed review process.” Id.
197
Id. at 2-3. The attorney’s personnel folder is governed by Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. Id.
198
Id. at 3 (known as a Standard Form 50).
199
Id.
200
Id. Copies of the reprimand may be maintained for both statistical
purposes and to support more “serious discipline for later offenses.” Id.
201
28 C.F.R. § 0.39b (2005). This regulation states, “[T]he Counsel and the
internal inspection unit shall maintain the confidentiality of the employee or
applicant unless the employee or applicant consents to the release of his or her
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for a prosecutor to leave the U.S. Attorney’s Office and still
practice law without record of his past misconduct.202
Additionally, records of attorneys’ conduct and investigations
by the OPR may be exempt from requests for information under
the Freedom of Information Act.203 In Jefferson v. Department of
Justice, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brought a FOIA suit
against the OPR seeking records regarding his prosecuting
attorney, AUSA Jeffrey Downing.204 Jefferson had accused
Downing of prosecutorial misconduct but the OPR found no basis
for any action.205 Jefferson requested “all records created and/or
received by OPR” with respect to Downing.206 The OPR responded
that it “‘is the policy of the Office when responding to FOIA
requests from third-party individuals to refuse to confirm or deny
the existence of records concerning Department of Justice
employees, absent their consent or ‘an overriding public
interest.’”207
When Jefferson brought suit, the government refused
disclosure of the AUSA’s records by invoking one of FOIA’s law
enforcement exemptions, Exemption 7(C).208 Exemption 7(C)
applies to “records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an

identity or the Counsel determines that the disclosure of the identity is necessary
to resolve the allegation.” Id.
202
See id. Only the most flagrant cases of misconduct require actual
suspension or removal, thus it should be mandatory that such findings remain in
the personnel record so that future employers are made aware of potential
professional unfitness.
203
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (6) (2002). See Jefferson v. Dep’t of Justice,
Office of Prof’l Responsibility, 284 F.3d 172, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
although the law enforcement record exemption of FOIA would protect certain
records from disclosure, the government does not have a blanket exemption).
204
284 F.3d. at 174.
205
Id. at 175.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 175. There are nine exemptions to the FOIA. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (2002).

LU MACROED.DOC

4/18/2006 12:41 PM

PROECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN TERROR CASES

413

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”209 The court in
Jefferson held that the government could not claim a blanket
exemption and remanded the case back to the trial court for
findings as to whether the non-disclosed documents did in fact fall
under the law enforcement exemption.210 The court held that
records received “in connection with government oversight of the
performance of duties by its employees” do not fall within the law
enforcement exception.211 OPR files that could lead to civil or
criminal sanctions, however, would fall within this exception.212
Under Jefferson, if the OPR has compiled information
regarding violations of only internal DOJ guidelines, the
information would be subject to a FOIA disclosure.213 Yet, this
standard may be considered overly broad because where there is a
violation of a DOJ guideline, there is often a violation of a
corresponding court rule or state ethics rule, which could lead to
civil or criminal liability. Therefore, the OPR could claim that such
files were not only compiled for internal sanction purposes, but to
effectuate state or court laws or the McDade Amendment.214
Furthermore, there is another bar to disclosure: once it can be
determined that certain files are not for law enforcement purposes,
there must be an analysis of whether the “public interest in
disclosure of any law enforcement records was outweighed by [the
prosecutor’s] privacy interests.”215

209

5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(7)(c) (2002).
Jefferson v. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility, 284 F.3d
172, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
211
Id. at 178-79 (quoting Weisberg v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
212
Id. at 284 F.3d at 177.
213
See id. Courts have found that failure to comply with internal guidelines
of an agency do not give rise to a cause of action. See Ellen S. Podgor, supra
note 103, at 191-92 (citing United States v. Lee, 274, F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir.
2001) and Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954)).
214
See discussion supra Part II.B.
215
Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178.
210
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The usual safeguards that promote ethical and professional
conduct on the part of prosecutors are undermined in terrorism
cases. The overarching gravity of national security and the
resulting deference to the prosecutors’ roles in terrorism cases
makes it difficult for the judiciary, defense counsel, and external
state bars to regulate the federal prosecutors’ conduct. This Note
recommends greater transparency by the OPR and a stricter
internal disciplinary process in combination with particular
Congressional oversight in terrorism cases.216
Improvements in OPR policy are fundamental. Judges may
report misconduct in their opinions or directly notify the OPR.
Judges, however, are limited by the information available to
them.217 The OPR on the other hand, may review all the evidence
(including grand jury testimony), speak with colleagues and
supervisors, and question the prosecutor. The OPR has the best
access to determine whether the prosecutor’s processes were
legitimate with respect to indictment, discovery, contact with
witnesses, and representations in court.
A. The OPR
With respect to terrorism cases, OPR should play an active
role. The OPR’s current policy is to passively wait for complaints
to arise.218 Additionally, the OPR will not investigate if the issue is
still before the courts.219 This delay often results in inadequate
216

Although many scholars and professionals have called for a
reformulation of how prosecutors are supervised, this section will deal primarily
with how to prevent prosecutorial misconduct within terrorism cases. For a
discussion of the debates surrounding supervision of federal prosecutors, see
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (2003). The
call for transparency is not a novel recommendation. See Zacharias, supra note
47 at 773-74.
217
MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 49, at 218.
218
GAO INFO ON OPR, supra note 103, at 6.
219
Id.
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investigations because evidence of possible misconduct becomes
stale.220 OPR can actively handle terrorism cases by appointing an
OPR official to oversee these cases on a periodic basis. For
example, when a CIPA exception is invoked, the OPR official
would be empowered to review such a decision.
Although this level of OPR supervision may antagonize
prosecutors and U.S. Attorneys, it is necessary to reformulate the
role of the OPR. OPR jurisdiction over the conduct of DOJ
attorneys should be presupposed. A culture of professionalism and
respect for ethics rules, internal guidelines, and federal statutes
should be the norm.
B. Congressional Oversight
The OPR has a duty to maintain its commitment to deterring
prosecutorial misconduct. In the past, the OPR’s commitment to
this goal apparently “rose and fell in direct proportion to the
personal interest an attorney general devoted to the issue.”221
Because the commitment to deterring prosecutorial misconduct
should not depend on the whims of a particular Attorney General,
Congress should have oversight.222
The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act, proposed in January 1999
220

Id. Furthermore, “[a] complaint may be closed administratively if, for
example, it . . . lacks sufficient evidence to warrant an inquiry.” Id.
221
MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 49 at 277. Attorney General Janet Reno
emphasized disclosure of prosecutorial misconduct and OPR proceedings unlike
her predecessors and successors. Id.
222
Although critics may question whether Congress has the power for such
oversight of United States Attorneys, Congressional oversight is essential to the
balance of powers. Although there may be those who argue that Congressional
oversight of DOJ attorneys would hamper the attorneys’ effectiveness in
pursuing justice, Congressional oversight would protect against threats to civil
liberties. As the DOJ continues to consolidate its powers with respect to criminal
prosecutions—this is seen with federal sentencing and limited disclosure in
terrorism cases—the judiciary and Congress need to be vigilant in supervision.
The Federalist Papers clearly highlighted the threat of too much power in one
branch: “this accumulation of powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
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by Senator Orrin Hatch of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
recommended such congressional oversight.223 Two important
elements of the Ethics Act required the Attorney General to
“establish a range of penalties for engaging in such prohibited
conduct, including reprimand, demotion, dismissal, suspension
from employment, referral of ethical charges to the bar, and
referral of evidence related to the conduct to a grand jury.” 224 The
Attorney General would also be required to “report annually to
specified congressional committees on the activities and operations
of DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility.”225
The Ethics Act should be reconsidered. It makes two important
reforms that would reinforce the current judicial, statutory, and
internal guidelines that protect against federal prosecutorial
misconduct.226 First, as addressed above, there would be a
formalized disciplinary process by formulating penalties for each
type of misconduct.227 Second, the Ethics Act would increase the
DOJ’s accountability as a whole by mandating that the Attorney
General report annually to Congress regarding the operations of
the OPR.228
Congress has the expertise and the ability to oversee OPR
investigations pertaining to possible misconduct in terrorism cases.
223

The Ethics Act was first proposed as an alternative to the McDade
Amendment. As discussed in Part II.B., supra, the McDade Amendment
subjects federal prosecutors to state ethics laws and rules. The Ethics Act, on the
other hand, would require federal prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules only
to the extent that the rules or laws do not conflict with the effectuation of federal
law or policy. For instance, a major criticism of the McDade Amendment was
that many state rules and laws bar attorneys from contacting represented
witnesses. This no contact rule is contrary to federal law and would ultimately
interfere with the prosecutor’s ability to efficiently investigate and prosecute a
case. Under the Ethics Act, prosecutors would still be subject to general state
ethics rules but with certain exceptions—such as in the case of the no contact
rule.
224
Federal Prosecutor Ethics Act, S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
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A congressional committee with authority to review confidential
national security documents may review the validity of the
indictments, the evidence presented, and contact with protected
witnesses.
CONCLUSION
The safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct are
significantly weaker in terrorism cases. By invoking the
importance of national security, the government has sought to limit
information and judicial processes in terrorism cases. Federal
prosecutors, who are essentially foot soldiers in terrorism cases,
should be supervised in order to ensure fairness in terrorism
prosecutions. For this reason, it is necessary to reevaluate the
DOJ’s internal oversight of its attorneys and to reformulate the
way prosecutors are sanctioned. The DOJ has historically guarded
the ability to discipline its attorneys. Thus, external supervision by
Congress is necessary to protect against the DOJ’s inherent bias.

